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INNOCENT OF A CAPITAL CRIME: PARALLELS 
BETWEEN INNOCENCE OF A CRIME AND 
INNOCENCE OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Ellen Kreitzberg* 
Linda Carter** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The death penalty continues to be a controversial topic in the United States today. 
Public debate ranges from the fundamental question of whether the death penalty is ever 
justified for a serious crime, 1 the legitimacy of lethal injection as a method of execution,2 
and, more recently, the likelihood of executing an innocent person. The modem death 
penalty statutes were enacted following Furman v. Georgia3 in 1972. At that time, the 
Supreme Court struck down existing death penalty statutes finding that they were 
unconstitutional. Although there was no single, majority opinion, the "middle" of the 
Court found that the procedures involved in the existing death penalty statutes created a 
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School. I would like to thank Santa Clara students Seth 
Gottlieb and Spencer Chen for their excellent research assistance. 
• • Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would like to acknowledge the 
excellent research assistance of McGeorge students Andrew McClelland, Ben Eilenberg, and Jennifer Alesio. 
I. Linda Caner & Ellen Kreitzberg, Understanding Capital Punishment Law 7- 16 (Lexis 2004). The 
book discusses the arguments for and against the death penalty. Initially, the analysis begins with the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of"cruel and unusual punishment." The debate turns to penological purposes, such as 
deterrence and retribution. The remainder of the discussion focuses on equality, fairness, and politics, such as 
the fairness of the system and financial cost of executions. See also Richard Dieter, Twenty Years of Capital 
Punishment: A Re-evaluation, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=543&scid=45 (June 1996) 
(discussing racial discrimination, inequality of the capital punishment system, deterrence, financial costs, and 
risk of executing the innocent and international developments). 
2. See e.g. LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 
1999); Henry Weinstein & Maura Dolan, Judge Concludes Hearings on Lethal Injection, L.A. Times, 
http://www.topix.net/content/trb/05148247 1638324089142834261 3434059356 137 (Sept. 30, 2006) (U.S. 
district court judge conducted a four-day hearing to consider whether California's lethal injection execution 
method is unconstitutional because it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment); see generally Lambright v. 
Lewis, 932 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Ariz. 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lambright v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 
477 (9th Cir. 1999); State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448 (Conn. 2000) (upholding lethal injection as constitutional). 
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The U.S. Supreme Court found the Georgia capital punishment 
statute unconstitutional, essentially striking down forty state death penalty statutes and invalidating six hundred 
death sentences. States responded with new death penalty statutes and procedures to avoid the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty. Five new state statutes went before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 
and the Court upheld three out of five statutes. Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upheld); Proffitt v. Fla., 
428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upheld); Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upheld); Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280 
( 1976) (invalidated); Roberts v. La., 428 U.S. 325 ( 1976) (invalidated). 
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substantial risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. 
In the years following, a complex system of laws, statutes, and procedures were 
enacted in an effort to satisfy the Court's concerns. These procedures were also designed 
to ensure, if not guarantee, that those who were convicted and sentenced to death were in 
fact guilty. 4 In 1976,5 however, there was little discussion about whether the death 
penalty would be used to execute an innocent person.6 At that time, courts were 
concerned about whether the death penalty served a legitimate penological purpose and 
whether inappropriate factors such as bias, discretion, geographical inequities, 
inadequate defense counsel, or race would play a role in the decision of who would live 
and who would die. 
Today, those same concerns exist. However, the question of innocence now looms 
large in the debate. We now know that innocent people have been convicted and 
sentenced to death.7 As one prominent legal scholar notes, "[w]e do in fact convict 
innocent people and do so in numbers, if not percentages, that should make us 
uncomfortable."8 Those who had earlier supported the death penalty began to express 
concern about the execution of an innocent person. 9 Even Supreme Court Justices have 
spoken publicly about the reality that innocent people are sentenced to death. 10 
4. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our society has a high 
degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers unparalleled 
protections against convicting the innocent."). 
5. !d. 
6. See Richard Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 6 1, 62---{)3 (2003) ("O'Connor's blithe 
confidence in the efficacy of our procedural protections in capital cases [as discussed in Herrera] was not 
challenged by any of the other Justices writing in that case, nor did her statement subject her to widespread 
criticism."). 
7. From 1973 through September 17, 2006, 123 people had been released from death row on grounds 
directly related to innocence. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=4 12&scid=6 (accessed Sept. 17, 2006); see Rosen, supra n. 6, 
at 78- 79 (noting that exculpations have come from DNA testing, confessions of actual parties to the crimes, 
new evidence, and the discrediting of prosecutorial evidence.). 
8. !d. at 64. 
9. Vincent F. Callahan, Jr., Virginia Needs a Moratorium on the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 17&did=322 (Jan. 3 1, 2002) (Callahan, a representative of 
the 34th House of Delegates at the time of the article writes, "In the past, I have been a strong advocate of the 
death penalty .... (H]owever, I have now become one of those who believe we must take another look at the 
death penalty." He further states, "[n]ew scientific evidence, such as DNA testing, has revolutionized all areas 
of crime detection, criminal prosecution and criminal defense."); Jeff Flock, "Blanket Commutation " Empties 
Illinois Death Row, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ LAW/Ollll / illinois.death.row/ (Jan. 13, 2003) (After thirteen 
inmates were exonerated, the outgoing governor, George Ryan, commuted all death sentences, stating "[o)ur 
capital system is haunted by the demon of error: error in determining guilt and error in determining who among 
the guilty deserves to die."); Gustav Niebuhr, Tucker Case May Split Evangelical Christians, N.Y. Times A20 
(Feb. 4, 1998) (noting that a national broadcast of one death row defendant's Christian faith transformation 
sparked a national debate among Christian evangelicals about "where justice should end and mercy begin."); 
George Will, Innocent on Death Row, Wash. Post A23 (Apr. 6, 2000) (noting that Oklahoma almost put to 
death an innocent man on death row stating, " ( c ]onservatives, especially, should draw this lesson from the 
book: Capital punishment, like the rest of the criminal justice system, is a government program, so skepticism 
is in order."). 
I 0. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 320 n. 25 (2002) (Justice Stevens voices concern that "in recent years a 
disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated."); 0 'Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. 
Times A9 (July 4, 2001) (In a speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers Association, Justice O'Connor states, 
" if statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed."); 
Justice: "Serious Flaws" in Death Penalty, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/08/07/death.penalty/index.html 
(Aug. 7, 2005) (Justice Stevens stated that " DNA evidence bas shown that a substantial number of death 
2006] INNOCENT OF A CAPITAL CRIME 439 
The public discussion of innocence has focused on a person who claims factual 
innocence of the crime charged. In capital cases, the crime is usually murder in the first 
degree. 11 An individual claims that he or she is not the person who committed the 
murder. From a legal perspective, innocence of the crime charged requires a showing 
that the government has failed to prove all elements of the crime. 
A second concept of innocence in capital cases is "innocence of the death penalty" 
or "innocence of death." 12 The Supreme Court adopted this phrase to refer to those 
defendants who are not eligible for a sentence of death because the state is unable to 
prove the basic eligibility criteria for imposing a sentence of death. 13 When a defendant 
is innocent of the death penalty, the government has failed to factually prove a 
constitutionally mandated factor that places the defendant in the pool of persons who 
may be sentenced to death. 14 
It is easy to understand both the meaning and importance of not executing a person 
innocent of the underlying crime. Public awareness and concern of factual innocence of 
the crime gained momentum once DNA evidence provided the basis for a number of 
exonerations, including some from death row. 15 The public image of innocence is a man 
or woman who walks out of prison after years of wrongful incarceration. 
Perhaps less dramatic but still constitutionally significant is the concept of 
innocence of the death penalty. There is no compelling public image for these men and 
women. A defendant innocent of the death penalty may still be guilty of the underlying 
crime of murder and therefore unlikely to gamer public attention or sympathy. However, 
in such cases, an aggravating circumstance is entirely lacking and a defendant should not 
be among the pool of persons to whom the death penalty should apply. An example of 
an aggravating circumstance is a murder that is committed in the course of a rape. It is 
the added element of rape that places the defendant in the pool of death-eligible 
individuals. If the defendant killed the victim, but is factually innocent of raping the 
victim and rape is the only aggravating factor in the case, the death penalty cannot 
constitutionally be imposed. The defendant is "innocent of the death penalty" or 
innocent of the death-eligibility element. Although deserving of punishment, this 
individual should not be executed. He also should be afforded access to federal courts 
sentences have been imposed erroneously. . . . [I)t indicates that there must be serious flaws in our 
administration of criminal justice."). 
II. See Carter & Kreitzbcrg, supra n. I, at 85-93 (discussing nonmurder crime statutes making defendants 
eligible for death, such as child rape and federal espionage). 
12. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,345 (1992). 
13. /d. ("[l]nnocent of the death penalty [means) allowing a showing in addition to innocence of the capital 
crime itself a showing that there was no aggravating circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility 
had not been met." (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)). 
14. See Cal. Pen. Code § 190.2(a) (1999) (providing that the penalty is death or a life sentence without 
parole for a defendant found guilty of first degree murder along with a finding of special circumstances, such as 
evidence that the perpetrator was a major participant in the crime and acted with reckless disregard for human 
life; the murder was especially heinous, manifesting exceptional depravity; or the victim was a police officer). 
In all capital cases, these eligibility criteria include proof of at least one valid aggravating circumstance. 
Aggravating circumstances add an element based on the nature of the crime or the status of the victim. For 
example, typical aggravating circumstances include murders in the first degree committed in the course of 
serious felonies, such as rape, robbery, kidnapping, or arson; murders in the first degree committed with torture 
or double homicides; and murders in the first degree of a judge, prosecutor, witness, or juror. See id. 
15. From 1973 through September 17,2006, DNA played a substantial factor in establishing the innocence 
of fourteen people released from death row. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra n. 7. 
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equal to that of a person innocent of murder for reviewing claims related to innocence. 
All questions of innocence of a crime are, at least initially, decided at trial. 
Culpability for the base crime, such as murder in the first degree, is decided during the 
guilt/innocence phase of a trial. In most jurisdictions, questions of innocence of the 
death penalty, or the existence of aggravating circumstances, are determined during a 
penalty phase. In some jurisdictions, the existence of an aggravating circumstance is 
decided during the guilt phase. 16 
There is overall agreement that the "trial is the 'main event"' where the question of 
innocence should be fully litigatedP In an effort to ensure a fair and reliable result at 
trial, the courts and the legislatures have established numerous procedural safeguards. 18 
But sometimes a jury makes a mistake or just gets it wrong; a person who is factually 
innocent of murder is convicted of the crime or one who is factually innocent of the 
aggravating circumstance is found eligible for the death penalty. 
What remedy is available to a person who is wrongfully found to be eligible for the 
death penalty? That is the question this article seeks to explore. The answer to the 
question is largely dependent on the availability of federal habeas corpus proceedings.19 
The current habeas statutory provisions and judicial decisions from the last thirty 
years reflect particular concern with claims of innocence.20 Despite the growing trend 
toward restricting access to federal court review, courts and legislatures continued to 
carve out exceptions based upon a sufficient showing of "innocence." The current 
habeas statute provides for relief from certain bars to habeas hearings upon a showing of 
innocence of the underlying offense.21 Judicial decisions have carved a miscarriage-of-
justice exception to habeas hearings upon a showing of "actual innocence" that includes 
innocence of the crime and innocence of the death penalty.22 
We must begin, therefore, with an understanding of innocence. We will compare 
innocence of a crime with innocence of the death penalty and demonstrate how a claim 
of innocence under either definition must be afforded the same deference in obtaining 
access to federal court. This may arise under two distinct scenarios. First, a court may 
rule that a petitioner has failed to comply with a state procedural rule and his claims are 
now barred from federal court. These "procedurally defaulted" claims may still be 
16. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262-63. 
17. McFarland v. Scali, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)) 
("A criminal trial is the ' main event' at which a defendant's rights are to be detennined, and the Great Writ is 
an extraordinary remedy that should not be employed to ' relitigate state trials. '"); see Holmes v. S.C., 547 U.S. 
1727, 1728 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Ky., 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the 
S ixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense. "'). 
18. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-17 (explaining the current mechanisms serving as protections for avoiding the 
execution of an innocent person). 
19. Another post-conviction remedy is clemency. Clemency, however, is not a judicial proceeding and is 
reposed almost exclusively in the executive branch. Carter & Kreitzberg, supra n. I, at 257. It is a process 
without standards, procedures, or effective review. Given the nature of clemency, it is a rare remedy for 
persons wrongfully convicted of a crime and even rarer for a person claiming a wrongful finding of an 
aggravating circumstance. As a result, we do not spend time discussing clemency in this article because, in 
reality, it is not a consistent or reliable remedy. /d. at 256-64. 
20. See id. at 239; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 ( 1995); Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 366-67. 
2 1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B), 2254(e)(2)(B) (2000). 
22. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 345. 
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heard in federal court when a petitioner raises a claim of actual innocence. We argue 
that these claims of innocence shold include claims of innocent of the death penalty. 
Second, we examine the changes in habeas corpus that were made in the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).23 Although this legislation 
dramatically restricted a petitioner's ability to present claims, the bill did retain an 
exception for a petitioner who makes a sufficient showing of innocence. Because there 
is no explicit defmition of innocence in the legislation, the question of whether the 
statute includes a claim of innocence of the death penalty within its purview has not yet 
been clearly determined. In this article we conclude that both claims of innocence of the 
crime and innocence of the death penalty should be included within the definition of 
innocence in AEDPA. 
This analysis begins with an examination of the Court's Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and how this impacts the procedures that are required in a capital trial. 
Then we will present a brief review of habeas corpus law and the barriers that have been 
imposed to restrict federal court review of claims. We will explain how AEDPA 
modified the ability of a petitioner to get evidentiary hearings and imposed restrictions 
on the filling of second or successive petitions. Then, we will look at circumstances in 
which claims of innocence may be raised in a petition for habeas corpus.24 Finally, we 
will compare the standards for review when claims of innocence are standing alone as 
the primary constitutional claim with claims of innocence that are coupled with other 
constitutional violations at trial to see how it impacts a petitioner's ability to prove 
innocence. 
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT J URISPRUDENCE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
The 1970s and early 1980s mark the beginning of modem death penalty 
jurisprudence. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court examined several existing 
death penalty statutes.25 The Court observed that, in recent years, although large 
numbers of defendants were technically eligible for the death penalty, it was neither 
sought by the prosecutors nor imposed by juries. The Court was concerned that the 
death penalty was being imposed in an arbitrary, or even racially discriminatory, manner, 
striking unpredictably and destroying the confidence that the death penalty was reserved 
for the worst of the worst.26 This concern led the Court to strike down almost all 
23. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1215 (1996). 
24. After a conviction at trial, a defendant may pursue a direct appeal to the appellate courts. This review, 
however, is not designed to examine questions of guilt or innocence but rather to look at the errors that the trial 
court may have made regarding admissibility of evidence, jury instructions, and perhaps the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 402 (noting the "(i]nquiry does not focus on whether the trier of fact 
made the correct guilt or innocence determination, but rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or 
acquit" (emphasis omitted)); People v. Bolden, 58 P.3d 931, 955 (Cal. 2002) (stating that appellate courts 
review '"the entire records in the light most favorable to the prosecution'" and the standard is whether '"a 
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"' (quoting People v. Kipp, 33 P. 
3d 450 (Cal. 2001))); Owens v. Stare, 611 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Md. Spec. App. 1992) (noting that courts will not 
overturn a verdict if the jury's finding of guilt is "rational"). 
25. 408 u.s. 238. 
26. See Carol Steiker & Jordan Steikcr, Defending Categonca/ t.'xemptions to the Death Penalty: 
Reflections on the ABA 's Resolutions Concerning the Execution of Juveniles and Persons with Menral 
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extstmg state statutes, finding that the procedures involved in extstmg death penalty 
statutes created a substantial risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner.27 The Court held that if states wanted to impose sentences of 
death, they needed more structure and consistency in the manner in which the sentences 
of death were decided. It was the unbridled discretion given to juries that made the 
existing death sentences unconstitutional. 
The states responded by passing new death penalty statutes almost immediately. 
By 1976, there were more than 450 sentences of death around the country, and the 
Supreme Court was ready to review the new statutes. Five cases went to the Supreme 
Court that year. The Court struck down two statutes that imposed a mandatory death 
sentence on defendants convicted of capital murder.28 Three of the statutes were upheld 
because the Court found that those statutes adequately addressed the constitutional 
defects that Furman found to be fatal. 29 
In reviewing the new statutes, the Court identified two distinct but critical aspects 
of a constitutional death penalty statute: (I) the discretion of the jury must be sufficiently 
directed and guided to ensure that the decision is not made in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner and (2) there must be an individualized determination of the sentence that 
considers both the crime as well as the character and background of the offender. It was 
in the penalty phase of the trial that new procedures were put into place to meet these 
constitutional requirements. 
This structure provided the basis for the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: 
to determine whether a state statute adequately narrows the class of individuals eligible 
for a sentence of death and adequately allows for individualized consideration of the 
defendant.30 States have adopted different methods for narrowing the class of death-
eligible defendants. 31 In most statutes, this narrowing occurs through the use of a list of 
enumerated aggravating circumstances.32 During the penalty trial , a jury must determine 
the existence of these aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt for a 
Retardation, 61 L. & Contemp. Prob. 89,98 (1998). 
27. There was no majority opinion in Furman with each Justice writing his own opinion. Justices Brennan 
and Marshall held that the death penalty was unconstitutional under all circumstances. Furman, 408 U.S. at 
257, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 314, 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and 
White-in the middle of the Court-found that the procedures involved in the existing capital punishment 
statutes created a substantial risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. /d. at 240,256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J. , 
concurring). 
28. Woodson , 428 U.S. at 286, 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329, 336. 
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207; Projitt, 428 U.S. at 253, 259; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276. 
30. Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639,661 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(describing an irreconcilable tension between the dual constitutional requirements of guided discretion and 
individualized consideration); Richard Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of 
Death, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 1103, 11!3- 15 ( 1990) (discussing the Court's reliance on these procedural protections 
to realize its Eighth Amendment goals). 
3 1. Eligibility for the death penalty must be distinguished from selection for the death penalty. Eligibility 
establishes when the government has demonstrated that this defendant falls within a pool of persons for whom 
the death penalty is an option. This is usually accomplished by the finding of an aggravating circumstance. 
Once a person is eligible for the death penalty, then the jury (or judge) may weigh the various aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed on this defendant for this 
crime. Carter & Kreitzberg, supra n. l , at 5154. 
32. Some state statutes provide the equivalent of aggravating circumstances as part of the definition of a 
capital crime. E.g. La. Stat. Ann.§ 14:30 (1997); Tex. Penal Code§ 19.03 (2003). 
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defendant to be considered for a sentence of death. The individualized consideration is 
met through the admission of mitigating evidence and the ultimate selection decision of 
death or life.33 While the selection decision is afforded broad latitude and discretion, the 
first two decisions are guided by specific elements or eligibility criteria that must be 
proved by the government. Most importantly, there is no "capital crime," meaning that 
the death penalty is not a punishment option absent a jury finding that at least one of the 
. . . 34 
aggravatmg circumstances IS present. 
III. THE CAPITAL TRIAL 
A capital trial is really two distinct trials: the guilt/innocence phase and the penalty 
phase.35 The first phase decides the question of guilt or innocence, and the second phase 
decides the question of the appropriate sentence. The second phase begins only if the 
jury or judge has found the defendant guilty in the first phase. 36 
A penalty phase resembles the guilt/innocence phase in many respects. The 
lawyers give opening statements, call witnesses, introduce exhibits, and make closing 
arguments. Just like the guilt/innocence phase, the judge instructs the jury at the 
conclusion on how to proceed during deliberations.37 Many of the same constitutional 
protections apply in both the guilt/innocence phase and penalty phase. For example, a 
defendant has a Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled testimony, a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and to present a defense, and a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process and equal protection.38 
There are three decision points for the jury or judge if the defendant waives the 
right to a jury. First, the fact finder makes a detennination that the base crime was 
committed. This is ordinarily murder in the first degree and always is decided in the 
guilt/innocence phase. 
The second decision is whether the defendant is "death eligible." This 
detennination usually occurs in the penalty phase, but in some states, it is part of the 
33. E.g. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (2006) ("If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first 
degree, and a special circumstance has been charged and found to be true, ... the trier of fact shall determine 
whether the penalty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of 
parole. In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the 
defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including ... the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition."). 
34. E.g. id. at§ 190.2. 
35. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a bifurcated proceeding is constitutionally required. 
However, after the Furman Court found the existing death penalty statutes unconstitutional, state legislatures 
responded by enacting new death penalty statutes, each of which created a bifurcated system with a separate 
proceeding for the penalty determination. When the Supreme Court reviewed Georgia's statute in Gregg, it 
acknowledged that the bifurcated procedure was one of the safeguards that helped ensure that the death penalty 
would not be imposed in a wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish manner. 428 U.S. at 162- 63, 206-07. 
Review supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
36. Tuilaepa v. Cal., 512 U.S. 967, 971 ( 1994) ("Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth 
Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decis ion-making process: the eligibility decision and 
the selection decision."); Carter & Kreitzberg, supra n. I , at 52- 54. 
37. E.g. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (providing that the proceedings during the penalty phase include evidence 
"as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence" and arguments made by counsel). 
38. See Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to 
have a jury determine the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating circumstances that make a case eligible 
for a sentence of death). 
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guilt/innocence phase. A jury must determine that the government has proven at least 
one aggravating circumstance in the case. The eligibility criteria-usually in the form of 
aggravating circumstances-act as a filter to determine those cases for which the death 
penalty is a permissible sentencing option.39 Aggravating circumstances are the means 
to distinguish one murder as worse than others and, therefore, eligible for a sentence of 
death. A conviction of murder in the first degree is not sufficient for the imposition of 
the death penalty. Without a finding of an aggravating circumstance, there is no 
possibility of imposing death as a punishrnent.40 
The Supreme Court has held that aggravating circumstances in a death penalty 
statute are the functional equivalent of the elements of the crime in the guilt/innocence 
triai.41 As a result, every defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
determine whether the statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven.42 
Aggravating circumstances are viewed as elements of a crime due to the function they 
perform in a capital trial. In the context of the guilt/innocence phase of a trial, the Court 
has held that if proof of a fact is necessary to increase the possible punishment, then that 
fact is the equivalent of an element of the crime.43 The prosecution must prove these 
facts beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defendant has a right to a jury determination of 
these facts. 
Aggravating circumstances perform this same function m the penalty 
determination of a capital case. An aggravating circumstance must be proven in order to 
increase the possible punishment for murder from the usual punishment to the death 
penalty.44 For example, in California, murder in the first degree is punishable by 
twenty-five years to life. If additionally, an aggravating circumstance --called a special 
circumstance in California-is proven, the defendant becomes eligible for one of only 
two possible punishments: life without the possibility of parole or death.45 Thus, a 
defendant convicted simply of murder is not eligible for and cannot be sentenced to 
death. If, however, a defendant convicted of murder is also convicted of an aggravating 
circumstance, such as a murder with torture, a murder in the course of a rape, or a 
murder in the course of a double homicide, the defendant then falls within the pool of 
persons for whom death is a possible punishment.46 The jury must find that the 
defendant committed the torture, rape, or double homicide beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the same manner that they deliberated and found the elements of murder in the first 
degree beyond a reasonable doubt.47 
The third decision is whether the death penalty should be imposed on the 
39. The Supreme Court has held that a death penalty statute must, in some meaningful way, narrow the 
class of cases eligible for death. In so doing, each statute must identify those characteristics it believes makes 
certain murders worse than others. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07. 
40. E.g. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a). 
41. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (stating that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the 
'functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by 
a jury" (quoting Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466,494 n. 19 (2000))). 
42. /d. 
43. Ring, 536 U.S. at 585; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19. 
44. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19. 
45. Cal. Penal Code§ 190.2(a). 
46. /d. at§ 190.2(a)(2), (a)( 17)(C), (a)( IS). 
47. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
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defendant. This is called "death selection."48 In many ways, the death selection 
decision is the heart of the penalty phase of the trial. While the eligibility decision asks 
whether this defendant is in the class of defendants on whom a sentence of death may, in 
fact, be imposed, the death selection determination asks whether this eligible defendant 
should receive a sentence of death. The Eighth Amendment requires that the selection 
decision include consideration not only of the circumstances of the crime but also the 
background and characteristics of the individual defendant.49 This is presented through 
mitigating evidence. The mitigation stage is an opportunity for a defendant to provide 
reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Mitigating factors may 
include the role played by the defendant in the crime, an abusive childhood, a mental 
disorder, or any information that allows for an individualized consideration of a 
defendant. 50 
The fact finder could make a mistake at any of the three decision points. First, the 
defendant might not have committed the murder. Second, the defendant might not have 
committed the aggravating circumstance-for example, the murder was not committed in 
the course of a rape or the murder was not a double homicide. Third, the defendant 
might not be deserving of death under the formula used by the state-for example, 
aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances. The third decision 
of death selection is more of a value judgment than a factual determination. In contrast, 
the first two decisions- whether defendant committed the murder and whether an 
aggravating circumstance exists- are factual determinations. With the factual 
determinations, a fact finder may make a mistake; a factually innocent person may be 
found guilty or a person who is innocent of the aggravating circumstance may be found 
to be within the class of persons eligible for death. In the latter instance, the defendant 
is, in essence, innocent of a "capital crime." 
Once the trial is over, what can an innocent person do?51 Does a defendant's 
ability to raise a claim of innocence at that point differ depending on whether he is 
innocent of the crime or innocent of the aggravating circumstance? The Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that the trial is the "main event."52 Ironically, at the same time 
the Court promulgated procedures to ensure reliability of a capital trial, it also began a 
48. There are really two separate and distinct determinations that must precede any sentence of death: "an 
eligibility decision and [a] selection decision." Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 917. The eligibility decision is based on 
whether this defendant is in the class of defendants on whom a sentence of death may, in fact, be imposed. !d. 
at 971-72. The selection determination is based on whether this eligible defendant should receive a sentence of 
death based upon consideration of not only the circumstances of the crime but also the background and 
characteristics of the individual defendant. /d. Although the Supreme Court and other courts did not initially 
frame these two distinct decisions, later case law began to articulate the two distinct determinations as part of 
the discussion. ld. at 971 ("Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different 
aspects of the capital decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision."). 
49. !d. at 272. 
50. Carter & Kreitzbcrg, supra n. I, at 137. 
51. Rosen, supra n. 6, at 107 (suggesting that if we are unable or unwilling to structure our criminal justice 
system to ensure that we do not execute innocents, the death penalty must be found unconstitutional and stating 
"[t)he innocence of any specific defendant is not the issue. If we cannot identify all of the innocents we 
execute, then the only way we can protect those innocents is to examine the capital punishment system as a 
whole to detennine whether the imperfections in the system undermine the constitutionality of the 
punishment."). 
52. Review supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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campaign to limit the ability of a defendant to get postconviction review. 
IV. WHAT I SlNNOCENCE? 
A. Innocence of a Crime and Innocence of the Death Penalty 
Innocence of the crime in a capital context refers to the underlying murder 
convictiOn. Innocence of the death penalty has come to mean innocence of death 
eligibility. The primary focus of death eligibility has been on aggravating circumstances. 
Without an aggravating circumstance, there is no capital offense that would render the 
defendant death eligible because the underlying murder, standing alone, is not a capital 
crime. This means that innocence of death eligibility should be treated as innocence of 
the underlying murder. However, innocence of the death penalty results in a reduction of 
punishment rather than freedom, as in the case of innocence of the crime. 
In the unique process of death penalty cases, death eligibility is comparable to 
elements of a crime because it defines a "capital crime."53 The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that death eligibility functions in a comparable manner to an 
element of a crime. In Sawyer v. Whitley, the Court held that "actual innocence" 
included innocence of circumstances or conditions that make a defendant death 
eligible.54 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that death 
eligibility should be treated the same as the elements of the crime: 
Insofar as petitioner's standard would include not merely the elements of the crime 
itself, but the existence of aggravating circumstances, it broadens the extent of the inquiry 
but not the type of inquiry. Both the elements of the crime and statutory aggravating 
circumstances in Louisiana are used to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death 
penalty. And proof or disproof of aggravating circumstances, like proof of the elements of 
the crime, is confined by the statutory definitions to a relatively obvious class of relevant 
evidence. 55 
53. The eligibility test was applied by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 
346 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820 (199 1) ('"[W]e must require the petitioner to show, based 
on the evidence proffered plus all record evidence, a fair probability that a rational trier of fact would have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to the existence of those facts which are prerequisites under state or federal 
law for the imposition of the death penalty. "'); Johnson v. Singletmy, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 ( lith Cir. 1991) 
("Thus, a petitioner may make a colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty by 
presenting evidence that an alleged constitutional error implicates all of the aggravating factors found to be 
present by the sentencing body. That is, but for the alleged constitutional error, the sentencing body could not 
have found any aggravating factors and thus the petitioner was ineligible for the death penalty. In other words, 
the petitioner must show that absent the alleged constitutional error, the jury would have lacked the discretion 
to impose the death penalty; that is, that he is ineligible for the death penalty." (emphasis in original)). 
54. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 347. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued for a broader definition of 
innocent of the death penalty. He reasoned that the constitutional application of the death penalty requires a 
jury to consider all mitigating evidence in making its decision as to whether this defendant should be selected 
for death. In a rare case, he posited, one may be innocent of the death penalty from either the degree or amount 
of mitigating evidence that was available but not presented to the jury. Finally, he notes with irony that 
although the Court espouses a "death is different" attitude, it then requires the same objective criteria for both 
its guilt and penalty assessment of innocence. /d. at 360-76 (Stevens, Blackrnun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring). 
55. /d. at 344-45 (majority). Although beyond the scope of this article, the language from Sawyer supports 
the argument that the absence of conditions of eligibility, such as the necessary mens rea for a felony-murder 
accomplice or the status of being mentally retarded, should also be a basis for claiming a miscarriage of justice 
or as support for a freestanding claim of innocence. /d. at 344-45. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that 
innocence of the death penalty included conditions of eligibility other than aggravating circumstances. Writing 
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The Court confirmed its view of aggravating circumstances as the equivalent of 
elements of a crime in Ring v. Arizona. 56 The holding in Ring- that there is a 
constitutional right to a jury determination on the existence of aggravating 
circumstances- was based on the recognition that aggravating circumstances function in 
the same manner as elements of a crime.57 In each case, the element or aggravating 
circumstance is necessary in order to increase the possible punishment allowable. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires a death penalty statute to narrow the class of 
perpetrators who are ultimately death eligible. Without that narrowing function, a death 
penalty scheme is unconstitutional.58 The aggravating circumstance performs this 
narrowing function and is indispensable to the constitutionality of imposing a death 
sentence. Because the aggravating circumstances are equivalent to elements of a crime, 
they are in essence part of the "offense" of a capital crime. There is no crime without an 
actus reus and a mens rea. Similarly, there is no capital offense without a finding of at 
least one aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, procedures for finding the existence of 
an aggravating circumstance are the same as for an element of a crime. 59 In the 
guilt/innocence phase or the penalty phase, the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circumstance exists or occurred. 
When an element of the crime is lacking, a defendant is not guilty. Similarly, if an 
aggravating circumstance is entirely lacking, there is no death eligibility and a defendant 
is "not guilty" of death. Death eligibility, in tum, transforms a noncapital crime into a 
capital crime. It is, thus, more accurate to speak of innocence of a capital crime or 
offense rather than to speak of death ineligibility.60 Nevertheless, because courts use the 
term innocent of the death penalty, we will use that term interchangeably with the more 
precise terms of"innocence of a capital crime" and "innocence of death eligibility."61 
Although it is logical to think of death ineligibility in broader terms than 
aggravating circumstances, courts have been reluctant to extend the idea of innocence of 
the death penalty to other death eligibility issues. One other area where an innocence of 
the death penalty claim has been recognized is when a defendant argues that he did not 
exhibit the requisite mental state or degree of culpable conduct constitutionally required 
to be eligible for the death penalty. Often referred to as the Tison factors, the Supreme 
Court held that the nonkiller in a felony murder must exhibit (1) major participation in 
the felony and (2) a reckless indifference to human life.62 
for the majority, he explained "(s]ensible meaning is given to the term 'innocent of the death penalty' by 
allowing a showing in addition to innocence of the capital crime itself a showing that there was no aggravating 
circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility had not been met." !d. at 345. 
56. 536 U.S. at 609. 
57. /d. 
58. Review supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
59. E.g. Cal. Penal Code§ 190.2(a) (requiring a finding of a special circumstance to be eligible for death). 
60. The term "capital crime or offense" also captures the reasoning of the Court in considering aggravating 
circumstances equivalent to an element that turns murder into capital murder or a noncapital crime into a 
capital crime. 
61. Cmmw. v. Wheeler, 541 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. 1988) (holding that a defendant's prior felony conviction 
v.:as not sufficient to constitute a '"significant history of felony convictions"' and that this "lone aggravating 
Circumstance found by the jury" could not stand, remanding the case for imposition of a life sentence). 
62. Tison v. Ariz., 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). Although the Court did not grant relief, finding that there was 
sufficient evidence of reckless indifference introduced at trial, the Court recognized a failure of the Tison 
factors as giving rise to a claim of innocent of the death penalty. See Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799, 802-805 
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Lower courts have refused to extend the eligibility definition to other contexts. In 
2004, the Supreme Court found that it was unconstitutional for a person who is mentally 
retarded to be sentenced to death.63 Following this decision, defendants argued in 
postconviction that because they were mentally retarded, they were innocent of the death 
penalty and should be permitted to introduce evidence of their innocence in a habeas 
corpus proceeding. Although the Supreme Court has not reviewed this question, lower 
courts have consistently rejected this argument. 64 Courts have found that the absence of 
mental retardation is not an eligibility factor for the death penalty.65 These courts posit 
that the absence of mental retardation is not an element of the death penalty in the same 
way that sanity is not an element of a crime.66 ln both cases, the government does not 
have the burden of proof on the issue. In the latter case, the government need not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane and in the former case the 
government need not prove that a defendant is not mentally retarded. Rather, the burden 
is on the defense to demonstrate that a defendant should be excluded from a sentence of 
death either because he is insane or mentally retarded.67 Consequently, courts have 
distinguished the issue of whether a defendant is mentally retarded-and therefore not 
eligible for the death penalty-from a failure by the government to prove an aggravating 
circumstance (which also renders a defendant ineligible for the death penalty). 
Courts have additionally declined to extend the definition of innocent of the death 
(8th Cir. 1994) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding culpability of a nonkiller involved in a 
felony murder). 
63. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. The Court had previously held that execution of the mentally retarded did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in Pemy v. Linaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 335 (1989). However, the Atkins Court noted that, since the Penry decision, a national consensus had 
developed against execution of the mentally disabled. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32 1. As evidence of this consensus, 
the Court cited the large number of states which had enacted prohibitions on such executions, the absence of 
states reinstating such executions since the Penry decision, and the rarity of such executions even in states 
which allowed them. !d. at 3 14-16. The Court also discussed certain deficiencies in mentally retarded persons 
in the areas of information processing, communication, abstract and logical reasoning, impulse control, and 
understanding of others and how these deficiencies act to lower the moral culpability of such offenders. Id. at 
318- 23. 
64. E.g. Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 326 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that "[t]he state does not have a 
corollary duty to prove that a defendant is 'not retarded' in order to be entitled to the death penalty"); In Re 
Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (2003) (5th Cir. 2003) (holding the defendant's evidence of his mental 
retardation made him innocent of the death penalty and that the absence of mental retardation is not an element 
of the sentence any more than sanity is an element of an offense; holding that neither Apprendi nor Ring render 
the absence of mental retardation the functional equivalent of an e lement of capital murder); Walton v. 
Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698 (W.O. Va. 2003) (holding that the Virginia statute governing mental 
retardation in death penalty cases did not treat lack of mental retardation as an element of the offense and 
specifically placed the burden on the defendant to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of the 
evidence); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622-23 (Ga. 2003) (overturning the habeas court's decision to grant a 
new trial on the issue of defendant's mental retardation); State v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267 (N.M. 2004) 
(stating "[w]e do not believe the absence of mental retardation is an element of a capital offense for purposes of 
analysis under Ring"); but see Simpson v. Dretke, 2006 U.S. Lexis 21873, **6-9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006) 
(agreeing that mental retardation might provide a basis for a claim of " innocent of the death penalty" but 
denying relief because the petitioner failed to raise his claim in state court and had the opporrunity to present 
this evidence in a clemency proceeding); State v. Jiminez, 880 A.2d 468, 483- 89 (N.J. 2005) (deciding the 
matter on the basis of state constirutional grounds and applying the principles of Apprendi, Ring. Blakely, and 
Booker to cases of mental retardation making it the functional equivalent of an element of the offense). 
65. E.g. Walker, 399 F.3d at 326; Johnson, 334 F.3d at 404-05. 
66. E.g. Walker, 399 F.3d at 326. 
67. For example, the Virginia starute does not treat lack of mental retardation as an element of the offense 
and the burden is on the defenst: to prove mcntnl retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson , 334 
F.3d at 403; Walton , 269 F. Supp. 2d at 692. 
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penalty to include a claim that compelling new mitigating evidence has been discovered 
that was not considered by the jury at trial.68 Because mitigating evidence only comes 
into play after a jury finds a defendant eligible for death, the courts reason that this 
evidence does not affect a jury's finding of whether a defendant is eligible for the death 
penalty.69 Because the failure to consider critical mitigating evidence affects the 
selection decision, not the eligibility decision, arguments that the defendant is innocent 
of the death selection decision have been rejected. As explained in the next section, the 
difference between death eligibility and death selection has caused confusion when 
courts attempt to apply innocence exceptions to habeas rules. This confusion has 
undermined the significance of the absence of proof of an aggravating circumstance. 
B. Habeas Corpus: Claims of Innocence as a Gateway to Habeas 
In the United States today, habeas corpus proceedings occur in both state and 
federal courts. A habeas proceeding is not a direct appeal from the conviction or 
sentence for the crime. Instead, it is a postconviction proceeding that allows for limited 
challenges to the continued detention of the individual. 70 Although state habeas 
proceedings are generally less restricted than federal habeas proceedings, most of the 
habeas corpus jurisprudence has come from federal cases. 71 Thus, postconviction claims 
of innocence are most likely the subject of federal habeas petitions. 
A federal habeas petition is a civil action brought by a state or federal inmate. 72 
Because most capital cases begin as state prosecutions, we will focus on federal habeas 
actions that challenge a state conviction and sentence. In federal habeas proceedings, a 
petitioner is limited to raising claims that are based on constitutional violations, 
violations of federal law, or violations of a treaty provision?3 A petitioner is not 
68. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 368 (Stevens, Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (taking exception to the 
Court's failure to include newly discovered mitigating evidence as a basis for innocence of the death penalty). 
Stevens argued that in restricting the definition in that way, the Court 
respects only one of the two bedrock principles of capital-punishment jurisprudence. As such, the 
Court's impoverished version of capital sentencing is at odds with both the doctrine and the theory 
developed in our many decisions concerning capital punishment. 
First, the Court implicitly repudiates the requirement that the sentencer be allowed to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence .... 
[T]he Court's holding also clashes with the theory underlying our capital-punishment 
jurisprudence. The non-arbitrariness- and therefore the constitutionality-of the death penalty 
rests on individualized sentencing determinations. 
/d. (emphasis omitted). 
69. Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003); Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (lith Cir. 2003); 
Johnson, 334 F.3d at 403. 
70. As one scholar described it, "(l]n theory, a federal habeas corpus petition is an independent civil suit, in 
which the prisoner asks only that a federal court determine the validity of his current detention. In substance, a 
habeas action constitutes a collateral challenge to the prisoner's treatment in state court." Larry W. Yackle, 
The American Bar Association and Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 L.& Contemp. Probs. 17 1, 172 (1998). 
71. Carter & Kreitzberg, supra n. I, at 197- 213. 
72 . See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[H]abeas corpus cuts 
through all forms and goes to the very tissues of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in 
subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether 
they have been more than an empty shell."). 
73. The most common constitutional claim raised is ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment. Another typical constitutional claim is the failure of the prosecution to tum over 
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permitted to raise evidentiary or procedural issues. 
Over the years, concerns with finality and comity led Congress and the Court to 
restrict access to habeas corpus proceedings.74 Critics of habeas proceedings 
complained about the length of time cases were litigated in the courts, especially in death 
penalty cases. The courts and the legislatures criticized capital defendants for filing 
multiple or successive petitions, arguing that these were merely efforts to delay 
executions rather than to review meritorious claims.75 Other criticisms focused on 
habeas litigation as an intrusion by the federal courts into the decisions of state courts. 
As a result, more and more restrictions began to appear that limited the scope of habeas 
review and the ability to file habeas petitions. Three of those limitations are relevant to 
claims of innocence. 
First, claims may be "procedurally defaulted." In order to restrict petitioners from 
bypassing state courts, there is a requirement that the petitioner "exhaust" state remedies 
before bringing a claim in federal court. 76 If a petitioner fails to properly raise a claim in 
state court, he may now be precluded from raising that claim because it would violate a 
state procedural rule. The most common example is the time limits that states impose 
within which claims must be filed. A claim that fails to comply with a state procedural 
rule is now procedurally defaulted, and a petitioner may not file that claim in his federal 
exculpatory evidence to the defense (a Brady claim). See Brady v. Md, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see e.g. Sawyer, 
505 U.S. at 347. 
74. E.g. id at 341 n. 7. After noting that it is a common occurrence for federal judges to be ovetwhelmed 
with last minute "successive or abusive habeas petitions," the Court stated 
We of course do not in the least condone, but instead condemn, any efforts on the part of habeas 
petitioners to delay their filings until the last minute with a view to obtaining a stay because the 
district court will lack time to give them the necessary consideration before the scheduled execution. 
A court may resolve against such a petitioner doubts and uncertainties as to the sufficiency of his 
submission. 
ld ; see Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas 
Catpus Cases, 77 N.Y. L. Rev. 699, 712- 15 (2002). This attitude of the Court was not always the case. Bryan 
Stevenson observed that 
[t]he Supreme Court's capital punishment decisions of the 1970's .. . signal[ed] a readiness on the 
part of the federal judiciary to protect death row prisoners from arbitrary or unfair imposition of the 
death penalty. . . . [The Court warned] that heightened standards of review and appellate scrutiny 
would be constitutionally required in capital case .... Consequently, by the late 1970's and 1980's 
capital litigation was not considered "final" until all available state and federal postconviction 
review had been completed. The new prototype for capital litigation was a nine-step process that 
almost always included petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 
Jd. at 716-17. 
75. E.g. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341 n. 7. ("While we recognize (the filling of a successive or abuse habeas 
petition a few days before a scheduled execution] as a fact on the basis of our own experience with applications 
for stays of execution in capital cases, we regard it as a regrettable fact. We of course do not in the least 
condone, but instead condemn, any efforts on the part of habeas petitioners to delay their filings until the last 
minute with a view to obtaining a stay because the district court will lack time to give them the necessary 
consideration before the scheduled execution."); but see Barbour v. Haley, 410 F. Supp. 2d 11 20, 1135-36 
(M.D. Ala. 2006) "[I]t is not hyperbole to view this case as undergirded by anguish, the anguish of death 
penalty lawyers who believe the death penalty system as broken .... (A]nguish ... founded on logic. It is a 
practical logic which is founded also on the belief that in the face of the limitations periods and other hurdles 
imposed on collateral review petitions, there are not enough lawyers willing or able to undertake representation 
of[defendants in a capital case] at a point where full review and investigation of a case already once lost can be 
mounted."). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(I)(A) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that ... the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State."). 
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habeas petition. Because of this restriction, many legitimate constitutional claims are 
thus barred from review in any court, state or federal. 77 
While procedural default is a judicially constructed concept, the second and third 
limitations on habeas petitions are statutory. The second restriction prohibits a petitioner 
from filing a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Congress passed this 
restriction in an effort to foster finality and conserve judicial resources. Under the 
habeas corpus statute, a petitioner is required to bring all available claims in a single, 
first habeas corpus petition. The limitations on second and successive petitions 
encourage petitioners to identify all issues within a short time frame and within one court 
action because an attempt to raise an issue in a later petition is likely to be barred. 
The third limitation restricts the ability of a petitioner to be granted an evidentiary 
hearing. These bearings in federal court are used to present evidence that was never 
presented at trial or which supports claims raised in the habeas petition. For example, if 
a petitioner claims that his trial attorney was ineffective, evidence may be presented at a 
hearing to demonstrate counsel's failures investigating or presenting the case at trial. In 
many cases, without an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts, a petitioner cannot 
demonstrate to the court that a constitutional error has occurred. 
Prior to 1996, neither the successive petition restriction nor the evidentiary hearing 
limitation included any explicit exception based on innocence. In response to the 
possible unfairness of precluding claims, successive petitions, and evidentiary hearings, 
the Supreme Court developed two exceptions to these rules. The first allowed the claims 
of a petitioner to be heard if the petitioner could show "cause and prejudice" for the 
lapse. 78 The second exception allowed a claim to be heard if a "miscarriage of justice" 
would result if the case did not proceed. 79 
It is this second exception, the miscarriage of justice exception, that is important in 
our discussion of innocence cases. Essentially equating miscarriage of justice with 
actual innocence,80 the Court held that this narrow exception would allow otherwise 
77. E.g. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (barring petitioner's federal habeas claim on the 
grounds of his failure to file notice of state court appeal within Virginia's statutory thirty-day deadline); 
Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an appellant's ineffective counsel claim was 
procedurally defaulted by his failure to raise it at the state court level); Aliwoli v. Gilmore, 127 F.3d 632 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (refusing to consider appellant's claim of improper rebuttal statements by prosecutor at trial and 
holding that because petitioner did not preserve the issue for appeal, the claim was procedurally defaulted at the 
state court level). 
78. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1997) (extending the bar of"federal habeas review absent a 
showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant to a state procedural waiver" to a waived objection to the 
admission of a confession at trial) (citing Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 ( 1976)). As one scholar 
observed, "[o]n the procedural side, the Court has foreclosed relief with narrow exceptions, to state prisoners 
who have failed to preserve their claims in state court, lost on the merits of the claims in prior federal petitions, 
or failed to raise issues that could have been raised in prior filings." Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal 
Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 303- 304, nn. 1- 3 (1993) (citing Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 72 (petitioner's 
failure to comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule at trial must meet the cause and prejudice 
standard); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (applying Sykes to petitioner's failure, because of 
attorney error, to file a timely appeal); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (applying Sykes' cause and 
prejudice standard to a petitioner's failure, because of attorney error, to raise a particular claim in his state court 
appeal); Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 333 (noting cause and prejudice standard applies to claims identical to claims 
heard and decided on merits in a previous petition); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (applying cause 
and prejudice standard to failure to raise new claims not presented in prior proceeding)). 
79. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91; see Steiker, supra n. 78. 
80. Stokes v. Armofllrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1989) (extending the miscarriage of justice exception 
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barred claims to be heard where an adequate showing of actual innocence was made by a 
defendant.81 Despite the limitations on habeas review, there continued to be support for 
the ability of a defendant to litigate claims of innocence.82 If a petitioner could 
demonstrate a required probability of actual innocence, the Court lifted the restrictions to 
hearing the claim, regardless of whether it was precluded as a second or successive 
petition, precluded as a request for an evidentiary hearing, or procedurally defaulted 
under the state rules. The standard set by the Court for demonstrating innocence varied 
depending on whether a petitioner claimed that he was innocent of the crime or innocent 
of the death penalty, but the availability of the exception did not vary. 
In Schlup v. Delo,83 the petitioner argued that he was entitled to have his 
procedurally barred claims heard because he was factually innocent of the crime. He 
claimed that he was not the person who committed the murder. Schlup argued that his 
evidence of innocence provided a "gateway" through which he could pass and have his 
other constitutional claims reviewed on their merits. The Court agreed and held that he 
needed to show that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.84 
In Sawyer v. Whitley, 85 the Court found innocence of the death penalty to be the 
functional equivalent to innocence of the crime. However, the Court required a 
defendant to meet a higher threshold to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice for these 
claims. Sawyer was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. He filed 
his first federal habeas petition, raising numerous claims of error at trial all of which 
were denied by the court on the merits. Sawyer then filed a second petition. The court 
refused to hear most of the claims raised in his second petition, holding that they were 
barred as either abusive86 or successive.87 Sawyer argued that the Court should hear his 
where federal constitutional error probably resulted in a verdict of death against one whom the jury would 
otherwise have sentenced to life in prison); Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a miscarriage of justice requires a defendant to show that a "constitutional error substantially undermined 
the accuracy of the sentencing determination ... [and) that, but for the constitutional error, the sentence of 
death would not have been imposed"). 
81. Steiker, supra n. 78, at 338 (stating "injustice occurs if an innocent person remains in jail when the 
'hook' of a federal claim could provide the occasion for his release"). 
82. E.g. McC/esl.y, 499 U.S. at 467 (extending the cause and prejudice exception to cases concerning 
"abuse of the writ through inexcusable negligence" in order to avoid fundamental miscarriages of justice and 
ensure that the ends of justice will be served); Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,454 (1986) (providing that in 
successive petitions, a habeas action that raises the same ground already raised and rejected in a prior petition, 
could be heard if it includes a "colorable showing of factual innocence."); Rosen, supra n. 6, at 77 n. 56 
(quoting Herrera where Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that "in a capital case a truly persuasive 
demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional 
and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." (Herrera, 506 
U.S. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted))). Compare this federal standard with Missouri's standard that 
allowed it to review a freestanding claim of actual innocence in death penalty cases under the authority of Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 565.035.3 (1984). Amrine v. Rober, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003); but see Henry J. Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142 (1971) (arguing 
that "with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner 
supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence"). 
83. 513 u.s. 298. 
84. ld. at 321 (emphasis added). Schlup was tried and convicted of murdering a fellow inmate and was 
sentenced to death. He claimed that he was actually innocent of the crime, and that the state unconstitutionally 
failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence at his trial. /d. at 301-13. 
85. 505 U.S. at 341. 
86. See id. at 338 ("[N]ew claims, not previously raised, ... constitute an abuse of the writ." (citing 
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claims because he was innocent of the death penalty88 and therefore he fell within the 
miscarriage of justice exception. The Court held that a defendant claiming that he is 
innocent of the death penalty must show by clear and convincing evidence that there was 
"a fair probability that a rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to the existence of those facts which are prerequisites under state or federal law for the 
imposition of the death penalty."89 
The status of the Sawyer and Schlup standards was thrown into question when 
Congress amended the habeas statute in 1996 with passage of AEDPA.90 This 
legislation was the product of some forty years of debate on the issue of reform of habeas 
corpus. It was designed to streamline the process of habeas corpus review through a 
number of procedural reforms, including redefining the standard of review for state 
cases,91 imposing a statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions,92 limiting the 
filing of second and successive petitions,93 and restricting the availability of evidentiary 
. fi h b . . 94 hearmgs or a eas petrtwners. 
Although AEDPA did not include any provisions that directly affected procedural 
default, there were amendments to the existing statutory provisions on the ability of a 
court to grant evidentiary hearings or to hear claims raised in a second or successive 
habeas petition. The AEDP A amendments included an "innocence proviso" as an 
exception to the general rules prohibiting second or successive petitions or the granting 
of an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner failed to develop the factual basis for the 
claim in state court. The exception for second or successive petitions requires a two-part 
showing: 
(A) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through 
the exercise of due diligence; and 
(B) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, 
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying oflense.95 
McC/esl.y, 499 U.S. 467)). 
87. Sawyer v. Whitley, 772 F. Supp. 297 (E. D. La. 1991 ). 
88. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 335. In a second federal habeas petition, Sawyer claimed a Brady violation, 
arguing the police failed to tum over exculpatory evidence that undermined the credibility of a prosecution 
witness as well as a statement by a child witness that Sawyer had attempted to prevent an accomplice from 
setting fire to the victim. /d. at 349. 
89. /d. at 346 (quoting Sawyer, 945 F.2d at 820). 
90. 110 Stat. 1214. 
91. 110 Stat. 1219 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to provide that no relief may be granted from a state 
decision unless the decision is "contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or ... based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."). 
92. 110 Stat. 1217 (adding to 28 U.S.C. §2244 a one-year statute of limitations for a writ of habeas corpus). 
93. 28 u.s.c. §2244(d)(l). 
94. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). 
95. 110 Stat. 1221 (emphasis added). The innocence proviso for evidentiary hearings is similar but not 
identical. It provides: 
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 
Court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing ... unless: .. . (A) the claim relies on ... a factual 
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 
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There are two aspects to the AEDPA provisions that impacted the review of claims 
of innocence. First, AEDPA still did not address how claims of innocence impact the 
ability of a court to hear an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. Second, AEDPA 
raised the threshold showing required to hear a second or successive petition from a 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. These changes raised 
several legal issues and questions. 
One of the important questions was whether the Schlup preponderance standard 
still existed for the miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default. This question 
was answered in the Court's recent decision in House v. Bel1.96 The Court granted 
House habeas relief under the standard set out in Schlup. The Court acknowledged that 
the habeas statute has no provision for claims barred by procedural default. 
Consequently, the Court held Schlup, and not AEDPA, applied. Because House's 
petition was his first federal habeas petition of a defaulted claim, AEDPA did not apply. 
The Court recognized its responsibility to review all the evidence, old and new, 
incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to admissibility.97 The Court then re-
articulated the standard in Schlup by "removing the double negative" stating that a 
petitioner must show that it was more likely than not any reasonable juror would have 
reasonable doubt.98 
In House, the government argued that the language of the AEDPA amendments 
increased the standard for all innocence claims to clear and convincing evidence. They 
posited that AEDPA had raised the standard for evidentiary hearings and successive 
petitions and that this higher standard should apply in cases of procedural default as well. 
The Court rejected this argument, finding that the Schlup preponderance standard still 
remained for the nonstatutory issue of procedural default in a first petition. As Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted in House, "[neither the successive petition nor 
the evidentiary hearing provision of AEDPA] addresses the type of petition at issue 
here--a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a 
showing of actual innocence."99 Using the reasoning of the Court in the House case, 
Sawyer should still govern claims of a miscarriage of justice to overcome procedural 
default when innocence of the death penalty is the basis of the claim. Exceptions to 
procedural default-whether innocence of the crime or innocence of the death penalty-
are simply not covered in the habeas statute. Case law must continue to provide the 
governing standards. 
Continuing to apply Sawyer to innocence of the death penalty claims does not 
create the same controversy as applying Schlup to claims of innocence of the crime 
because Sawyer requires the same clear and convincing standard of proof as in the 
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of 
the underlying offense. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). For our discussion, it is important to note that the proviso includes both a standard of 
"clear and convincing evidence" and the phrase "underlying offense," the same as the proviso for successive 
petitions. !d. 
96. 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
97. !d. at 2077 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327- 28). 
98. !d. 
99. /d. at 2078. 
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amended habeas statutes. Consequently, the tests as set out in Sawyer and Schlup should 
continue to govern when a showing of innocence can overcome a procedural default 
barrier and is allowed to be heard. 
The more difficult issue is whether AEDPA's amended language of innocence of 
the underlying offense still includes a claim of innocence of the death penalty as an 
exception to the bars on successive petitions or gaining an evidentiary hearing. 
Specifically, the question is: does the underlying offense allow the filing of a successive 
petition or the granting of an evidentiary hearing only to one who is innocent of murder 
or does it also include one who is innocent of the aggravating circumstance? 
There is little evidence that the changes in the language dealing with successive 
petitions and evidentiary hearings were intended to preclude a claim of innocence of the 
death penalty. The language in AEDPA requiring a showing of innocence of the 
underlying offense occurs in the statutory provisions that pertain to both noncapital and 
capital cases. In noncapital cases, there is, of course, no innocence of death eligibility or 
capital crime to consider. Thus, the generic language would be appropriate where the 
vast majority of habeas cases are noncapital and claims of innocence would refer to 
innocence of the underlying crime. 
AEDPA also includes what has been referred to as "opt-in" provisions for capital 
cases. The opt-in sections provide a whole separate set of rules, restrictions, and tests for 
those states that qualify as an opt-in state. 100 An examination of the opt-in provisions 
also provides no direct evidence of a legislative intent to exclude a claim of innocent of 
the death penalty from the definition of innocence. These provisions do not directly 
address limitations for the review of successive petitions or the granting of an evidentiary 
hearing. Instead, the opt-in provisions refer back to the general habeas provisions on this 
issue. 
For example, title 28 U.S.C. § 2262 provides for the granting of stays under certain 
circumstances. One basis for a stay is to meet the standards of the general habeas 
provision, § 2244b, which includes an innocent of the underlying offense provision. 
Section 2266 of the capital opt-in provisions uses the terms "ends of justice" and 
"miscarriage of justice" from Schlup and Sawyer as part of the reasoning for permitting 
delays in rendering decisions in capital habeas cases. Thus, if anything, the opt-in 
provisions appear to be re-enforcing the pre-AEDPA terminology and concepts that 
include innocent of the death penalty. 
The legislative history of the opt-in provisions is inconclusive at best. An earlier 
draft that addressed the circumstances under which a stay of execution may be obtained 
limited its application to a showing of innocence of the underlying offense. In the final 
bill, however, this restriction was deleted. The commentary by the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight Findings indicates an understanding that underlying 
offense in the proposed limitation on stays excluded death eligibility. 101 The fact that 
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261- 2266 (2000) (For states to "opt in" for expedited habeas review, they must have the 
U.S. Attorney General certify that the state has established a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, 
and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in state postconviction proceedings 
brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death. The statute also establishes time and tolling 
requirements on habeas petitions.). 
101. H.R. Rpt. No. 104-23 at 16-17 (1995)(stating "[u]nder proposed 28 U.S.C. 2257(c), the notion of cause 
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this language was struck from the provision supports the interpretation that Congress did 
not intend to eliminate the notion of innocence of death eligibility from the habeas 
calculation. 102 Additionally, the Committee's analysis refers to underlying offense as 
the same definition of actual innocence used by the Supreme Court in Sawyer. Sa~er's 
defmition of actual innocence, of course, included innocent of the death penalty or death 
eligibility. All in all, the legislative history leaves one without a satisfactory answer on 
the meaning of underlying offense. 
The ambiguity in the meaning of underlying offense is also reflected in conflicting 
judicial decisions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the phrase underlying 
offense includes the concept of death eligibility when deciding whether to allow review 
of a successive petition. 103 In Thompson v. Calderon, 104 the petitioner argued that he 
was innocent of rape, which was the only aggravating circumstance -called a special 
circumstance in California-that made the murder a death-eligible crime. 105 Based upon 
his evidence of innocence, Thompson argued he should be permitted to file a successive 
habeas petition.106 The court agreed. 107 It articulated three reasons to support its 
finding that underlying offense included death eligibility. First, it appeared that 
Congress had adopted the standard the Supreme Court set out in Sawyer that included 
death eligibility as a form of actual innocence. 108 Second, the change in language to the 
phrase underlying offense likely reflected the fact that the successive petition provision 
applies to noncapital and capital cases.109 Third, because death eligibility is necessary to 
have a capital murder, Thompson was in essence claiming innocence of the "conviction 
of the 'underlying offense' of capital murder." 110 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a different view and interpreted 
underlying offense to exclude death eligibility. 111 In the case of In re Medina, the court 
found that the petitioner's challenge of death ineligibility, the invalidity of both 
aggravating circumstances in his case, did not fit within the meaning of the underlying 
offense. 1 12 
for failing to raise a claim earlier is spelled out in standard fashion as connoting state action in violation of 
federal law or the unavailability of the legal or factual basis of the claim at the time of earlier proceedings. The 
restriction of the class of claims that may be raised in paragraph (3) of subsection (c) is based on the definition 
of 'actual innocence' suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in Salryer v. Whitley. 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
Only claims impugning the reliability of the petitioner's conviction for the underlying offense under the 
specified standard could be raised. In light of the requirement that a claim must relate to the underlying offense 
for which the capital sentence was imposed, proposed 28 U.S.C. 2257(c) bars raising at this stage claims that 
go only to the validity of the capital sentence and claims that go only to the petitioner's eligibility for a capital 
sentence."). 
I 02. One could argue that the Committee's understanding of "underlying offense" indicates that underlying 
offense in the general habeas provisions excludes death eligibility. However, the Committee was unclear, 
confused, or simply failed to understand the state of the case law. 
103. Thompson, 151 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1998). 
I 04. /d. 
I 05. /d. at 920. 
106. /d. 
107. !d. at 921 , 924. 
108. Thompson , 151 F.3d at 923- 24. 
109. !d. at 924. 
II 0. !d. at 923- 24. 
Ill. In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556 (lith Cir. 1997). 
112. Jd. at 1566. 
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There are other cases that appear to find that innocence of the death penalty is not 
included in underlying offense. These cases are cited by courts and commentators as 
examples of judicial decisions that underlying offense does not include innocence of the 
death penalty. In most of the cases, however, the issue is death selection and not "death 
eligibility." Death selection has never been included in the meaning of actual innocence, 
even under Sawyer. Because these cases do not in fact involve innocence of death 
eligibility, they add to the confusion and inconclusiveness of judicial determinations of 
I . fti 113 1 h fi p 114 h .. the meaning of under ymg o ense. n t e case o n re rovenzano, t e petitiOner 
claimed both to have discovered new mitigating evidence and that four out of five 
aggravating circumstances alleged in his case were invalid. 115 The court denied leave to 
file a successive petition because these were "sentencing stage" claims. 116 Similarly, in 
the case of In re Jones, 117 a case in which the petitioner was claiming that the electric 
chair was cruel and unusual punishment, the Eleventh Circuit found this to be a 
sentencing stage claim and not related to the underlying offense. 118 In Burris v. 
Parke, 119 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the defendant's claim that 
additional mitigating evidence would have changed the sentence did not qualify as one 
affecting the underlying offense in the innocence exception to the restriction on 
evidentiary hearings. 120 In each of these cases, the claim related to death selection or 
imposition and not to a death eligibility issue. 
The issue remains unsettled in academic literature. Two highly regarded 
authorities on habeas corpus suggest that because Congress passed AEDPA using almost 
the identical language as Sawyer, any interpretation of the AEDP A language should be 
consistent with that in Sawyer. Therefore, underlying offense is better construed as 
encompassing death ineligibility. 121 
113. See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also 
indicated in dictum that it would consider "underlying offense" to exclude innocence of the death penalty. 
Similar to the misconception in the other circuits, the Fourth Circuit made this comment in a case involving a 
claim that mitigating evidence had not been presented. Again, this is not a claim of death ineligibility. The 
Fourth Circuit further failed to recognize that there might well be a difference between exceptions to the 
judicial doctrine of procedural default, which would use Sawyer, and exceptions to the statutory limits on 
evidentiary proceedings and successive petitions. /d. at 164 n. 8. 
114. 215 F.3d 1233 (lith Cir. 2000). 
115. ld. at 1235- 37. 
116. /d. at 1237. 
117. 137 F.3d 1271 (lith Cir. 1998). 
11 8. /d. at 1274. 
11 9. 116 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hope v. U.S., 108 F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997). In Hope, the 
defendant was convicted of a firearm charge with a sentence enhancement for prior convictions; he challenged 
the enhancement. The court found that Hope could not maintain a successive petition because the sentence 
enhancement did not qualify as relating to the "underlying offense." /d. at 120. 
120. /d. at 258-60. 
121. See Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas C01pus Practice and Procedure§ 20.2b, 914 
(5th ed., LexisNexis 2005) ("Because the provision verbally replicates the Supreme Court's Sawyer standard, 
and because Sawyer established that standard in the process of defining the phrase 'innocence of the death 
penalty,' the provision arguably is meant to encompass ineligibility for the death penalty."); Stevenson. supra 
n. 74, at 739-40. Stevenson further points out that the better interpretation, as a matter of statutory 
construction principles, is to presume that Congress meant the words to mean the same as they do in Sawyer. 
!d.; but see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations 
of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 587, 611 
(2005) (describing, in reference to the AEDPA provision on second or successive petitions, that Congress 
created an innocence exception that excludes ineligibility of the death penalty). 
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Even if the language of the statute itself were read to preclude an innocence of 
death eligibility claim, a judicially managed equitable consideration would be 
Appropriate. The judicially developed miscarriage of justice exception is intended to 
operate in tandem with the statute. This purpose would seem to remain equally strong 
post-AEDP A. In Schlup, the Supreme Court observed that it had "repeatedly noted the 
interplay between statutory language and judicially managed equitable considerations in 
the development of habeas corpusjurisprudence."122 They acknowledged that the 1966 
amendments to the habeas statute had deleted language that referred to general "ends of 
justice" concems. 123 Nevertheless, the Court had found that a successive petition must 
be heard to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 124 
The same reasoning and policy that support a miscarriage of justice exception to 
restrictive habeas rules also support continuing to recognize innocence of a capital crime 
as falling within that exception. In House, the Court reaffirmed that the miscarriage of 
justice exception was an appropriate balance of"'the societal interests in finality, comity, 
and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that 
arises in the extraordinary case. "'125 This balance is upheld, in large part, because the 
miscarriage of justice exception is applied infrequently and only in the most meritorious 
cases. 126 The Court recognizes that to allow a conviction and sentence of an innocent 
person to stand is a manifest injustice. At the same time, the Court continues to honor 
the need for finality, respect for state court decisions, and conservation of federal judicial 
resources. 
C. Habeas Corpus: Claims of Innocence as a Freestanding Claim 
While most of the habeas cases focus on innocence as a gateway to a hearing on a 
constitutional claim, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, defendants have also filed 
habeas petitions with freestanding claims of innocence. This means that the petitioner 
does not challenge any procedures that took place at trial but rather simply claims that 
despite a constitutional trial he or she is innocent of the crime. A freestanding claim of 
innocence argues that the execution of an innocent person is unconstitutional and should 
be heard in a habeas proceeding. 
It may be a surprise to some that this question is a matter of debate, discussion, and 
disagreement even among the members of the Supreme Court. And yet, twice in thirteen 
years, the Supreme Court was directly asked to decide whether it was unconstitutional to 
execute an innocent person and both times failed to give a direct answer. First in 1993, 
in Herrera v. Collins, 127 and again in 2006, in House v. Bell, 128 the Court ultimately 
avoided a decision directly on this issue. Both times, however, several justices did 
122. 51 3 U.S. at 319 n. 35. 
123. !d. at 320. 
124. !d. at 318- 26. 
125. 126 S. Ct. at 2076 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 
126. !d. at 2077 (emphasizing that "the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the 
'extraordinary' case" (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327)). 
127. 506 U.S. 390. In Herrera, the question was whether the newly discovered evidence of innocence 
without an underlying constitutional violation was grounds for federal habeas relief. 
128. 126 S. Ct. 206. 
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express their views on how this question should be answered. 
[n Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, "assumed" without 
deciding that, in a capital case, the execution of an innocent person would be 
unconstitutionai. 129 However, a majority of the Court held that the evidence of 
innocence presented by Herrera fell far short of a "truly persuasive showing of 
innocence" which was needed for the Court to review his claim.130 Six of the Justices 
nonetheless expressed the view that executing an innocent person is unconstitutionat. 13 1 
Justices Scalia and Thomas were equally emphatic that the Constitution does not and 
cannot protect a defendant from this possibility. 132 
At the time Herrera was decided, there had been only forty-eight exonerations 
from death row and none had been as a result of DNA evidence. 133 [n 2006, the 
landscape changed dramatically. During the thirteen years between Herrera and House, 
there had been seventy-five death row exonerations, 134 fourteen on the basis of DNA. 
[n nondeath penalty cases, DNA exonerations numbered one hundred ninety-four. 135 
By 2006, the execution of an innocent person was a reality the Court could no 
longer ignore. The House case presented to the Court the question of whether it was 
unconstitutional to execute an innocent person. 136 House argued that he was innocent of 
the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. He presented to the Court 
new evidence to support his innocence. This included DNA evidence that positively 
excluded House as the source of semen stains found on the victim's clothing. Blood 
129. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 ("We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case that in a 
capital case a truly persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a 
defendant unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such 
a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on 
the need for finality ... and the enormous burden that having to retry cases ... would place on the States, the 
threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high."). 
130. !d. Herrera was executed by the state of Texas on May 12, 1993. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Execution 
Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (accessed Jan. 15, 2007). 
131. Justice O'Connor wrote, "I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the 
innocent in inconsistent with the Constitution." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O'Connor & White, JJ.. concurring). 
Justice White wrote, " I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial, even though 
made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence, would 
render unconstitutional the execution [of a defendant]." !d. at 429 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun 
wrote, "[n]othing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the 
conscience than to execute a person who is actually innocent." !d. at 430 (Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., 
dissenting). The dissent concluded that it violated both the Eighth Amendment as well as the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and ultimately concluded that "[t]he execution of a person who can show 
he that is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 446. 
132. !d. at 428. Justice Scalia wrote, 
I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly 
that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an innocent man 
who has received ... all of the process that our society has traditionally deemed adequate. 
fd. (Scalia & Thomas, JJ. , concurring) (footnote omitted). More recently, in Kansas v. Marsh, Justice Scalia 
dismissed the notion of executing an innocent person as virtually impossible stating "( o ]ne cannot have a 
system of criminal punishment without accepting the possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly ... 
But with regard to the punishment of death in the current American system, that possibility has been reduced to 
an insignificant minimum." 126 S. Ct. 2516,2539 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
133. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Innocence List, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article. 
php?scid=6&did= II 0 (accessed Jan. 28, 2007). 
134. /d. 
135. Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know (accessed Jan. 3 1, 2007). 
136. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2086. 
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stains found on House's jeans belonging to the victim was identified as coming from the 
sample tube of blood collected during the autopsy and not from the victim during the 
altercation- the presence of a preserving enzyme was found in the blood and three-
fourths of the tube from the autopsy was empty-and there was evidence that the 
husband had a motive to kill his wife, including evidence of prior abusive behavior 
toward her, recent threats to get rid of her, and a confession to two of his friends that he 
had murdered her. 137 
House asked that the Court articulate a standard for evaluating a defendant's claim 
of innocence. Once again the Court declined. It assumed, as it had in Herrera, that a 
claim of innocence was possible but that House had not presented enough proof to 
satisfy such a claim.138 Because House barely met the Schlup gateway standard, the 
Court found that he would not meet a Herrera freestanding claim standard.139 
A freestanding claim of actual innocence is based on the assumption that the trial 
was constitutionally adequate. Therefore, the evidence of innocence must be so strong 
that it alone undermines the reliability of the conviction, thereby making the execution 
unjust and unconstitutional. Because the standard is so difficult to meet, there are few 
cases in which the issue has been raised. 140 
As with gateway claims, freestanding claims of innocence also raise the question 
of whether it is unconstitutional to execute a person who is innocent of the death penalty 
or innocent of the aggravating circumstances. This is a far more difficult question than 
with the gateway claims since the Court has still not ruled whether it is constitutional to 
execute a person who is innocent of the underlying murder. However, the parallels of 
innocence of the crime and innocence of the aggravating circumstances are identical to 
the parallels in the gateway context. Assuming it is unconstitutional to execute a person 
who is innocent of the murder, it should also be unconstitutional to execute a person who 
is not eligible for the death penalty. 
Whatever hurdles may be imposed on raising innocence as a freestanding claim, it 
would be illogical not to recognize the execution of an innocent person as a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. The constitutional issue does not go away because the 
defendant had an error-free trial. A strong precedent here is the Court's holding that it is 
137. /d. at 2078- 86. The Court distinguishes the different manner in which the issue might arise. If House 
had either requested an evidentiary hearing or was filing a second or successive habeas petition, the case would 
have to be decided under AEDPA which provides for review only upon a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for 
the death penalty under applicable state law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), 2254(e)(2) (providing 
different standards for successive petitions and evidentiary hearings). 
138. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2087. The Court stated "(w]e decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here, 
much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this 
petitioner has not satisfied it." /d. 
139. /d. ("The sequence of the Court's decision in Herrera and Schlup-firstleaving unresolved the status 
of freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway standard- implies at the least that Herrera requires 
more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It follows, given the closeness of the Schlup question here, 
that House's showing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera."). 
140. E.g. In re Byrd, 269 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2001). Byrd claimed, in his second habeas petition that he was 
innocent of the death penalty based upon an affidavit of his co-defendant, Brewer, who alleged that he, not 
Byrd, fatally stabbed the victim in the case. /d. at 565. The court dismisses the claim because Byrd was unable 
to satisfy that "'extraordinarily high'" threshold showing required under Herrera, and the information Byrd 
presented was not newly discovered evidence. Rather, Byrd was on notice of this information as early as the 
filling of his first habeas petition, making this case the "quintessential abuse of the writ." /d. at 565, 572. 
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unconstitutional to execute a person who is insane at the time of execution. Such an 
individual may well have had an error-free trial. The concern is with the status of the 
individual prior to the execution. Similarly, an individual who is innocent of murder or 
innocent of capital murder is in a category of persons whom the state should not 
constitutionally be entitled to execute. The defendants in these categories should be able 
to raise the constitutional issue in federal habeas, even if it is necessary to meet an 
exacting standard such as a "truly persuasive" showing. The courts are adept at finding a 
balance between respect for finality and the constitutional concerns, and the high 
d . f h . . I 141 threshold standar prevents erosiOn o t ose pnnc1p es. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legal issues in capital cases are highly complicated, whether at the pretrial 
stage, the dual trial stages, or the mandatory appeals and, most certainly, in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. We should not, however, allow the complexity to mask the 
simplicity of the issue of innocence of a capital crime. The capital nature of the crime 
occurs when the element of an aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The same Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict exists for this element of a 
capital crime. Innocence of this capital crime is the same as innocence of murder, the 
prerequisite crime for most capital offenses. The status and function of aggravating 
circumstances as an element of a capital crime, in tum, necessitates applying the same 
rules for gateway and freestanding claims of innocence that are applied in noncapital 
cases. 
If a petitioner is innocent of an aggravating circumstance, he should be allowed to 
pass through the gateway to overcome any procedural default, successive bar, or 
restriction on an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner should also be permitted to raise a 
freestanding claim of innocence of the death penalty under the same premise as Herrera 
and House: that it is unconstitutional to execute an innocent person. The Court has 
consistently warned that "death is different"142 and suggested that heightened standards 
of review should apply in capital cases. Nowhere is this more critical than in questions 
of innocence. 
141. For an example of the difficulty of prevailing on an innocence of the death penalty claim, review 
Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319 (5th Cir. 1994). Jacobs was sentenced to death for the murder of Etta Urdiales. 
!d. at 1322. At his trial, he testified that his sister had killed the victim and that, although he was present, he 
did not know that she had a gun. /d. At his sister's trial, the state changed its position and claimed that Jacobs 
was telling the truth and that Jacobs neither did the killing nor knew his sister had a gun. !d. at 1322- 23. The 
state called Jacobs to testifY at his sister's trial. !d. at 1323. In his postconviction appeal, Jacobs argued that he 
was not guilty of capital murder because under Texas law he had to either intentionally cause the death of the 
victim or anticipate that the death would result. Jacobs, 31 F.3d at 1324; Tex. Penal Code Ann.§§ 19.02(a), 
19.03(a) (2003). Jacobs argued that the government's concession to that effect in his sister's trial was "newly 
discovered evidence" that entitled him to relief in habeas corpus. Jacobs, 31 F. 3d at 1324. The court did not 
dispute that his claim raised an issue of innocence of the death penalty. Nonetheless, the court denied Jacobs 
relief, finding that he failed to satisfY the "extraordinarily high" showing required for a freestanding claim of 
innocence." /d. Jacobs was executed on January 4, 1995. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (accessed Jan. 15, 2007). 
142. 428 U.S. at 305 ("The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, 
however long. Death in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a I 00-year prison term differs 
from one of only a year or two."); see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995) (recognizing that the Court's 
"'duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital 
case"' (citations omitted) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987))). 
